The effect of plant closure on crime by Rege, Mari et al.
Discussion Papers No. 593, September 2009 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Mari Rege, Torbjørn Skardhamar, Kjetil Telle 
and Mark Votruba 
The effect of plant closure on 
crime 
 
Abstract: 
We estimate the effect of exposure to plant closure on crime using an individual-level panel data set 
containing criminal charges for all unmarried and employed Norwegian men below the age of 40. 
Men originally employed in plants that subsequently closed are 14 percent more likely to be charged 
of a crime than comparable men in stable plants. There is no difference in charge rates prior to 
closure, supporting a causal interpretation of our result. Within crime categories, we find no effect of 
plant closure on property crime, perhaps because closure has a small and insignificant effect on 
subsequent earnings. We estimate an effect of plant closure on categories of non-acquisitive crime, 
suggesting a role for mental distress or idleness. A role for idleness is supported by evidence that the 
effects of plant closure on crime tend to be more pronounced for crimes committed during the week 
than on weekends. 
Keywords: crime, plant closure, plant downsizing, displacement 
JEL classification: J12, J63, J65 
Acknowledgement: We are grateful to seminar participants at The Harris School at the University of 
Chicago and to Gordon Dahl and Terje Skjerpen for useful comments and suggestions. Financial 
support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0417418) and the Norwegian Research Council 
(160965/V10) is gratefully acknowledged. 
Address: Mari Rege, University of Stavanger, and Statistics Norway, Research Department.  
E-mail: mari.rege@uis.no 
Torbjørn Skardhamar, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: ska@ssb.no 
Kjetil Telle, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: ska@kjetil.telle.no 
Mark Votruba, Economics Department, Weatherhead School of Management, Case 
Western Reserve University, USA, and Statistics Norway, Research Department.  
E-mail: mark.votruba@case.edu 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a 
Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it 
may include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers  
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
 
Statistics Norway 
Sales- and subscription service  
NO-2225 Kongsvinger 
 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95 
E-mail:  Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
3 
1. Introduction  
The costs to society of crime are substantial. Estimates suggest that the costs of crime may exceed 10 
percent of GDP in developed countries (Entorf and Spengler 2002, p. 91). Besides material damage 
and other tangible costs, victims and potential victims of crime also incur psychological costs. As a 
consequence, crime prevention initiatives have great priority in many countries. In addition to 
traditional enforcement, these initiatives often consist of educational and job assistance programs, 
motivated by the notion that crime is closely linked with employment opportunities.  Public and 
political interest in possible links between labor market conditions and crime has risen in the face of 
the ongoing worldwide recession (Hauser and Baker 2008). 
 There is a rich economic literature exploring the link between labor market conditions 
and crime.1  Much of the empirical work in the literature draws on US data sources to estimate the 
relationship between area (usually state) unemployment rates and crime, with the general finding that 
unemployment has a modest but statistically significant positive effect on property crime rates, with 
little or no effect on violent crime rates.2  These findings are consistent with traditional economic 
rational choice theories of crime, which predict that a reduction in licit earnings opportunities 
increases the allocation of time towards crime for profit (Ehrlich 1973, Becker 1968). However, there 
is limited empirical evidence investigating the mechanisms through which labor market conditions 
may affect criminal behavior.  
 We contribute to the existing literature by bringing longitudinal individual-level data to 
bear on the relationship between labor market experiences and crime behavior, specifically, by 
investigating the impact of plant closures on the subsequent crime behavior of affected workers. 
Workers suffering involuntary job loss represent an important subset of individuals through which 
weakening labor markets might affect crime rates. Focusing on plant closure allows us to investigate 
the impact of involuntary job loss while circumventing the most obvious forms of omitted variable 
bias. In addition, employing micro-level data allows us, to some degree, to explore different 
mechanisms that have been theorized to explain the link between job loss and criminal behavior.       
                                                     
1 Freeman (1995) surveys earlier research in this area. More recent contributions to this literature include Lin (2008), Oster 
and Angell (2007), Edmark (2005), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Machin and 
Meghir (2004), and Grogger (1998).  
2 Employing instrumental variable methods to address measurement error problems and the endogeneity of state 
unemployment rates, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008) find that a one percentage point increase in 
unemployment raises property crime rates 4-6 percent. Studies that fail to address the endogeneity of state unemployment 
rates have generally produced estimates a third as large. Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) employ IV methods similar to 
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008). They estimate smaller effects of state unemployment rates (calculated 
over non-college educated men) in models that simultaneously estimate the effect of local wages.   
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 Our analysis draws on two Norwegian data sources maintained by Statistics Norway. The 
first comprises detailed register data on the criminal charges brought against any resident from 1992 
through 2004. A second longitudinal register database known as the FD-trygd provides a rich array of 
socioeconomic and demographic variables for the entire resident population during that same period. 
Employment spell records in the FD-trygd allow us to calculate employment counts by plant and year, 
used to identify workers employed in a plant in 1995 that subsequently closed or was stable.   
 Our main analytic sample consists of over 44,000 unmarried men, 18-40 years old, who 
were employed with at least one year tenure in 1995, and who worked in plants that either remained 
stable or closed over the following five years.3  Our effect estimate is based on comparisons of 
covariate-adjusted criminal charge rates across young adult male workers originally employed in 
closing and stable plants. The crucial identifying assumption is that unobserved determinants of crime 
are uncorrelated with the likelihood that an individual worker’s plant closes. Importantly, if this 
assumption does not hold, we would expect workers in closing plants to have higher (or lower) rates of 
criminal behavior prior to 1995, which we can directly test. 
 Our empirical results show that young unmarried men’s exposure to plant closure has a 
substantial effect on criminal behavior. The likelihood of any charge being brought against men 
originally employed in plants that subsequently closed is about 14 percent higher than for men in 
stable plants. Notably, charge rates prior to 1995 are modestly lower for men originally employed in 
stable plants compared to men in closing plants, with virtually no difference in covariate-adjusted 
rates. This supports the causal interpretation of our results.  
 Within crime categories, we find no evidence that involuntary job loss increases property 
crimes. Instead, we find significant evidence for an increased likelihood of being charged with serious 
traffic violations (19 percent increase), which is the most common crime in our sample. Our point 
estimates also suggest a substantial increase in the likelihood that a worker is charged with violent 
crime (15 percent) or crimes related to alcohol and drugs (16 percent), though these estimates are 
imprecise and not statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a recent paper by Eliason 
and Storie (2009) showing that job loss associated with plant closure significantly increases the risk of 
hospitalization due to traffic accidents and alcohol-related conditions. 
 There exist at least two different mechanisms that are consistent with the finding that 
displaced workers increase non-acquisitive criminal behavior. Firstly, the finding is consistent with 
criminological theories that highlight the importance of frustration and mental distress in determining 
criminal behavior (Agnew 1992). Substantial empirical evidence indicates that exposure to plant 
                                                     
3 While we also comment on results for married men, we focus on unmarried young men between 18-40 years since women 
generally commit very few crimes, and since the number of offenders drops substantially with age into mature adulthood 
(Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983). Marriage is also negatively associated with crimes (Laub et al. 1998).  
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closure and job loss imposes mental distress on affected workers (e.g. Vahtera and Kivimaki 1997, 
Dragano, Verde and Siegrist 2005). Secondly, job loss could increase rates of non-acquisitive crime 
through increased idleness (Felson 1998), which affords individuals greater opportunities to engage in 
criminal behavior.  
 We explore the plausibility of the idleness mechanism by utilizing data on the day-of-
week that crimes were committed. If job loss increases criminal activity by increasing idleness, we 
expect the crime effect to be more pronounced on weekdays, with little differences on weekends. 
Consistent with the idleness mechanism, we find a significant effect of plant closure on crimes 
committed during the week, but no significant effect on crimes committed on weekends. This result is 
largely driven by effects on traffic violations and crimes related to alcohol and drugs. The result for 
crimes related to alcohol and drugs is in line with a literature that links job displacement and 
involvement in crime to consumption of alcohol and drugs (Dawkins 1997, Schroeder et al. 2007, 
Crawford et al. 2006, Eliason and Storie 2009).  
 Our finding that involuntary job loss has no significant effect on property crimes contrasts 
with the macro-level analyses linking higher unemployment to higher rates of property crime. One 
possible explanation is that the effect of unemployment on property crime rates operates through 
individuals with marginal attachment to the labor market, rather than through individuals (like those in 
our sample) who lose a job to which they have been closely attached. An alternative explanation is that 
the combination of the generosity of the Norwegian social safety net and low unemployment rates 
limits the extent to which displaced workers are motivated to replace licit with illicit earnings. 
Consistent with this, we estimate only a modest and insignificant negative effect of plant closure on a 
measure of workers’ subsequent earnings that includes unemployment and sick leave benefits.4  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant 
contextual details about Norway which might be important in interpreting our findings. Section 3 
discusses theoretical mechanisms through which plant closure could affect criminal behavior. Section 
4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses data and measurement issues that arise in 
studying crime, and Section 6 describes the dataset. Section 7 presents our results. Section 8 concludes 
by discussing our results in the context of existing findings in the literature and mechanisms consistent 
with our results.  
                                                     
4 It is noteworthy that Oster and Agell (2007) and Edmark (2005) find that local area unemployment rates in Sweden, another 
Scandinavian country with extensive safety net programs, have qualitatively similar effects on crime rates as observed in US 
data. However, since the early 1990s the unemployment rates in Sweden have been much higher than in Norway.   
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2. Unemployment and Crime in a Scandinavian Welfare State  
Over the last decades, Norway has been characterized by low unemployment rates, even by 
Scandinavian standards. In 2007, the survey-based unemployment rate was 2.5 percent, compared to 
4.6 percent for the US and 7.1 percent for the European Union (OECD 2009). With strong demand for 
workers, the effects of job loss may not be as dramatic in Norway as in other developed countries. 
Moreover, the public welfare programs in Norway are generous by international standards. Virtually 
all Norwegian workers are covered by the state’s unemployment benefit program. The size of the 
unemployment benefits is typically around two-thirds of the earnings in the previous calendar year, 
and until 2003 a typical receiver was eligible for unemployment benefits for up to three years (now up 
to 2 years). Persons not finding a new job when the unemployment benefits run out can get benefits of 
the same magnitude by participating in medical or vocational training programs or by qualifying for 
disability pension. Public benefit programs related to sick leave, unemployment, disability and 
vocational training constitute a widely-used income security net for Norwegian workers, and in recent 
years almost one fourth of the non-elderly adults in Norway have been receiving benefits from one of 
these programs at every point in time (St.meld. 2007). 
 As in the other Scandinavian countries, Norway has among the lowest crime rates in the 
western world. Norway has a murder rate of 0.71 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared with rates of 5.62 
in the US and 1.41 in England and Wales (UN 2008). Similar differences are found in the International 
Crime Victim Surveys, where Norway is among the 15 countries with lowest victimization rates (van 
Dijk et al 2008). The differences in incarceration rates are also remarkable. While the US incarceration 
rates are about 751 per 100,000 inhabitants (BJS 2009), the UK rate is about 140 (European 
Sourcebook 2006), and Norway’s rate is about 91 (Statistics Norway 2008). Attempts to explain these 
differences often refer to Norway’s social safety net, as well as to less punitive policies than in the US 
and the UK (Christie 2000).  
3. Mechanisms 
Work by Gary Becker is the typical point of departure for economic studies on the causes of crime. 
Becker (1968) models criminal behavior under standard assumptions of rational choice theory, 
whereby individuals commit crime when the expected utility from doing so exceeds the expected 
utility of legal behavior. While Becker (1968) was primarily interested in optimal criminal 
enforcement, a number of economic studies have extended his model of criminal behavior (see, e.g., 
overview in Levitt and Miles 2007). Of particular importance are the extensions of Ehrlich (1973), 
who introduces a time constraint whereby individuals divide their time between licit and illicit 
activities.  
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 Insights from the models of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) suggest two 
complementary mechanisms through which involuntary job loss might increase criminal behavior. It 
has been documented that exposure to plant closure and job loss reduces future earnings and 
employment (Jacobson et al. 1993, Stevens 1997, Huttunen et al. 2006, Rege et al. 2009). As a result, 
job loss could be expected to increase the marginal benefit associated with illicit earnings, while 
decreasing the relative time cost of engaging in illicit activities. The models of Becker (1968) and 
Ehrlich (1973) therefore predict that job loss should shift the allocation of time towards crime for 
profit. These rational choice-based models provide somewhat weaker predictions with respect to non-
acquisitive crime. Job loss might reduce the time cost of engaging in non-acquisitive crime, but such 
crimes fail to compensate for the reduction in licit earnings.         
 Somewhat in contrast to rational choice-based models, criminologists and sociologists 
have primarily focused on self-control and opportunity as the foremost determinants of crime. In their 
widely cited “general theory of crime”, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that the individual-level 
association between unemployment and crime can be explained by low self-control. This personality 
trait is formed in early childhood and is associated both with criminal behavior and with difficulties 
succeeding in work and school. The main methodological concern in estimating effects of job loss on 
crime is to rule out such spurious associations (see Section 4).5 In a meta-analysis of the relevant 
criminology literature, Pratt and Cullen (2000) find consistent associations between individuals’ 
criminal behavior and measured levels of self-control.  
 The emphasis on self-control suggests a mechanism through which job loss might 
increase criminal behavior. Convincing evidence suggests that job loss imposes mental distress on 
affected workers (e.g. Vahtera and Kivimaki 1997, Dragano et al. 2005, McKee-Ryan et al. 2005). 
Agnew (1992) argues that distress and feelings of unfair treatment can trigger frustration and anger, 
which lead to reduced constraints to breaking laws and social norms, as well as aggressive reactions in 
adverse situations. To the extent that job loss, subsequent unemployment and declining income 
increases mental distress and frustration, Agnew’s theory predicts an increase in non-acquisitive 
offenses, particularly violence.  
 Idleness represents another mechanism through which job loss might increase criminal 
behavior, including non-acquisitive crimes. Without ignoring variation in individual propensities for 
crime, Felson (1998) argues that even individuals motivated to commit crime cannot do so unless an 
opportunity is present. Less structured daily routines, like no longer going to work, and increased 
idleness time provide greater opportunities for criminal activity. Increased idleness may also increase 
                                                     
5 Crime might also have a causal effect on employment opportunities as the stigma from a criminal record restricts future 
access to meaningful jobs (Pager 2003, Grogger 1995, Mocan and Rees 2005). In other words, crime might be both a cause 
and an effect of poor labor market opportunities. 
8 
one’s exposure to criminogenic settings, where alcohol and drugs may be present and where the social 
norms against deviant behavior are weaker (Hirschi 1969). Importantly, under this mechanism we 
might expect the effect of job loss on crime to be particularly pronounced during the work week, when 
crime opportunities among the employed are more limited.  
 Notably, the idleness mechanism is closely related to Ehrlich’s (1973) rational choice 
model, since both conceive “time availability” as a critical determinant of criminal activity (which it 
obviously is). However, the two theories differ in their implications for the effects of job loss on 
different types of crimes. Rational choice-based models predict a larger increase in crimes for profit 
resulting from job loss, due to the increased marginal utility associated with illicit earnings. In 
contrast, the idleness story provides no special prediction with respect to crimes for profit, but instead 
emphasizes the increased opportunities to get into trouble that idleness affords, which depends on the 
social context idled workers inhabit. For our sample of young men, we would especially expect this to 
include alcohol and drug related offenses, but could extend to other types of crimes as well.  
4. Empirical Strategy 
We estimate the effect of exposure to plant closure on crime by comparing involvement in crime 
across men previously employed in closing and stable plants. The crucial identifying assumption is 
that plant closure events are uncorrelated with unobserved individual determinants of crime. Our 
dataset allows us to measure plant downsizing by looking at changes in employment levels by plant 
and year. We will refer to the plant downsizing rate (PDR) as the percentage change in employment 
between 1995 and 2000. More precisely, the plant downsizing rate in worker i’s plant is given by 
(1) 95 00
95
−
=
i i
i
i
x x
PDR
x
, 
where 95
ix  and 00
ix  are point-in-time plant employment counts in 1995 and 2000, denoting number of 
workers (full-time equivalents) in worker i’s plant at the end of the year, excluding worker i himself. 
In the following, we will refer to a plant reducing employment by more than 90 percent (i.e. 
.90>PDR ) as a closing plant, and a plant with no reduction in employment (i.e. 0≤PDR ) as a stable 
plant. Our main analytic sample will comprise unmarried young men whose plant of employment in 
1995 either closed by 2000 (i.e. .90>PDR ) or remained stable during this period (i.e. 0≤PDR ).  
 We estimate the following logit model for the probability that a young man 
employed in 1995 commits at least one crime over 2000-2004: 
(2) ( ) ( ),04 0Pr 1 α η α= = Λ + +i i X iC W X  
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where 
Ci,04 ~ indicator that man i commits at least one crime over 2000-2004. 
Wi ~ indicator that the plant in which the man is employed in 1995 is closing (i.e. 
.90>PDR ). 
Xi ~ vector of 1995 characteristics of man i, including past criminal behavior and 
other socio-economic variables at the individual level and at the plant level. 
 
 The parameter of interest in equation (2) is η, which captures the incremental increase in 
a man’s likelihood of committing crime due to plant closure (of his 1995 plant of employment), 
relative to men whose plant of employment in 1995 is stable. The crucial assumption for a consistent 
estimate of η is that plant closure events are determined by exogenous economic shocks and are 
independent of unobserved determinants of individual crime.  
 Estimates of η are potentially biased if men in plants that subsequently close have higher 
(or lower) unobserved propensities for crime. For instance, men who expect to commit crimes 
potentially may have lower demand for stable employment, possibly causing an over-representation of 
such men in plants that subsequently close.  Alternatively, unobserved “third factors” (e.g. low self-
control or high discount rates) could lead men with higher propensities for crime to self-select into less 
stable plants. If so, we would expect men in plants that subsequently close to have higher unobserved 
propensities for crime, biasing the estimate of η upwards. Along these same lines, it is possible that 
men with higher unobserved propensities for crime tend to gain employment in industries more prone 
to plant closures, again resulting in upwards bias. 
 Biases could also arise from the geographic location of closing plants and their respective 
workers. If plant closures are concentrated in disadvantaged neighborhoods, with poor labor market 
conditions and high crimes rates, this could give rise to two potential sources bias. First, if social 
interaction effects exist in criminal behavior (see e.g. Glaeser et al. 1996, Sampson and Raudenbush 
1999, Ludwig and Kling 2007, Bayer et al. 2009), men in closing plants might disproportionately live 
in areas where social norms against criminal behavior are weaker. Second, areas disproportionately 
affected by plant closure might be those where the opportunities for criminal activity are greater.   
 Our empirical analysis addresses these potential sources of bias in a number of ways.  
Potential biases arising from the self-selection of men into certain types of plants can be addressed, at 
least partly, by controlling for a wide range of plant characteristics. Potential biases arising from area-
specific confounders are addressed by estimating models with thousands of neighborhood fixed 
effects. Most importantly, however, if the propensity for crime is greater among men employed in 
plants that subsequently close, this should reveal itself in higher rates of crime by these men prior to 
the plant downsizing event. Our ability to control for an individual’s involvement in crime prior to the 
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plant downsizing event addresses this source of bias. Moreover, we are able to test directly whether 
workers in closing plants had higher crime rates prior to plant closure. We also apply propensity score 
methods to assure that our estimates of η do not suffer from heterogeneity bias. 
 It should be noted that, absent the sources of omitted variable bias identified above, our 
results potentially under-estimate the impact of plant closure on crime since our plant closure measure 
is based on a worker’s original plant of employment. Job mobility across closing and stable plants 
would therefore tend to attenuate our estimates.6  
5. The Measurement of Crime  
A problem for any empirical study of crime is the difficulty in measuring criminal activity. Typically, 
measures are constructed from either survey self-reports or registered crimes. Self-reports of criminal 
activity should be interpreted cautiously since they are often impossible to validate and since there are 
incentives to misreport (MacDonald 2002, Kirk 2006). In particular, the extent of truthful self-
reporting is lower among subjects with an extensive criminal record compared to subjects with little or 
no criminal history (Hinderlang et al. 1981). A key advantage of register data is that “registered 
crimes” can cleanly be identified.  Moreover, register data has the advantage that offenders cannot 
choose not to be registered, while they may decline to participate in a voluntary survey. 
 A disadvantage of register data is that the probability of capture (and thus appearance in 
the register) depends on the number of offenses committed, even though active offenders may be less 
likely to be caught for any given crime than inexperienced one-timers (Farrington et al. 2003). This 
may cause us to overestimate the effect of job loss on crime if, for example, unemployment tends to 
raise criminal activity more among subjects with a criminal record than among those without and there 
are more subjects with a criminal record in closing plants. This type of bias may also arise from 
enforcement behavior; for example, if the police tend to focus attention on subjects with particular 
personal characteristics which are correlated with unemployment (Waddington et al. 2004). Our ability 
to carefully control for previous engagement in crime should address such concerns.  
 A second problem with register data is that crimes which are not reported to (or not 
recorded by) the police are not captured and that crimes which are not “solved” cannot be matched to a 
specific individual. The extent of these problems could differ across crime types. For instance, crimes 
                                                     
6 In this regard, we could improve our estimation strategy in the framework of an “event study,” using plant-specific closure 
dates to inform our analysis. However, doing so would require us to identify with reasonable precision a “date of closure” 
for every closing plant that reflects the date at which individual workers became aware of their impending job loss. We have 
no way of definitively knowing when workers became aware of an impending job loss related to their plant’s closure. In 
addition, identifying a single “closure date” is problematic because closing plants often close after a series of employment 
reductions. 
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at the work-place are often settled without involving the police (Nelken 2002, Ellingsen and Sky 
2005), while this is less so for burglary. In this sense it is an important advantage of our dataset that 
we can also look at sub-categories of crime, where serious differences in registration across men in 
stable and closing plants may be considered less likely. Still, we should keep such limitations in mind 
when interpreting the results.  
6. Dataset Description 
We combine two register databases provided by Statistics Norway that can be merged using a unique 
personal identifier provided every Norwegian resident at birth or immigration. The first database 
contains complete records of criminal charges for every Norwegian resident over the period 1992-
2005. We utilize offenses committed through 2004 due to the lag between the time offenses are 
committed and the charges. The database contains all serious crimes, but also misdemeanors like 
drunk driving, excessive speeding and shop lifting. A person is registered as “charged” if the police 
perform an investigation and conclude that the person did commit the recorded crime. The 
investigation may be initiated by the police receiving a report or by an arrest. The registration is 
independent of the further outcome of the case (filing of formal charges, prosecutions or convictions). 
Date of crime and detailed codes of “offense type” are also included on charge records. Statistics 
Norway has constructed sub-categories of crime and we rely on these definitions to construct crime 
categories that correspond to those used by the US FBI (see Appendix A).  
 The second database is called FD-trygd. It is a rich longitudinal database with records for 
every Norwegian resident from 1992 to 2005, containing individual demographic information (marital 
status, sex, age, time of marriage, number of children), socio-economic data (years of education, 
income, wealth), current employment status (full time, part time, minor part time, self-employed), 
industry of employment, indicators of participation in any of Norway’s welfare programs, and 
geographic identifiers for about 14,000 different neighborhoods of residence.  
In particular, FD-trygd contains records for timing of employment “events” since 1995. These events, 
captured by individual and date, include entry and exits into employment, changes in employment 
status (full time, part time, minor part time), and changes in plant and firm of employment. These 
employment records are constructed by data analysts at Statistics Norway from raw employment spell 
records submitted by employers, and verified against employee wage records (not available to us) to 
ensure the validity of each spell and to eliminate records pertaining to “secondary” employment 
spells.7 
                                                     
7 If an individual was employed in multiple plants at a given time, primary employment was determined by employment 
status and recorded income (not available to us) from each source of employment.   
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 Based on the employment records, we constructed plant-level employment counts at the 
end of year 1995 and 2000. The counts were constructed as measures of full-time equivalents (FTEs), 
with part time and minor part time employment measured as 0.67 and 0.33 FTEs, respectively. 
Excluded from these counts were any person identified in FD-trygd as self-employed or receiving 
assistance that should have precluded full time work (those receiving unemployment benefits, 
rehabilitation pensions or disability pensions). Plant-level FTEs were then used to construct the 
measure of plant downsizing from 1995 to 2000 as defined in Equation (1).  
 Our main analytic sample consists of unmarried men between 18 and 40 years of age in 
1995. The sample selection criteria were driven by two considerations. First, sufficiently high rates of 
crime are required to estimate effects with any precision. We therefore focus on the demographic 
group responsible for most crime: young, unmarried men (Freeman 1996). Second, to study effects of 
job loss, these men need to have had some connection with the labor market. We therefore restrict the 
main analytic sample to men that were full-time employed at end of 1995, excluding a few cases 
where the man receive assistance that should have precluded full time work, like disability or 
unemployment benefits. We also require the man to have at least one year of tenure in the plant in 
1995 to ensure attachment to one’s current plant of employment. 
 To facilitate interpretations of our results, we restrict the analysis to men working either 
in a stable or a closing plant. As a precaution against the plant closure variable being correlated with 
unobserved individual determinants of crime, we exclude men working in a plant with less than 10 
FTEs in 1995. The resulting dataset consists of 44,391 unmarried men, living in 9,770 different 
geographically defined neighborhoods.  
 Variables capturing individual and plant socio-economic characteristics were constructed 
based on FD-trygd records for 1995. A large number of such variables are included in all models (see 
Appendix B).  
 Summary statistics for some of these variables are presented in Table 1 (with standard 
deviation in parenthesis) for our main analytic sample. About 8.1 percent of our sample committed a 
crime from 2000 to 2004, and about 32 percent of our sample worked in a plant in 1995 that 
downsized by more than 90 percent from 1995 to 2000.  
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7. Empirical Results 
7.1. Descriptive Evidence  
We start by observing from Table 1 that the charge rate over 2000-2004 (Charged 2000-2004)8 for the 
sub-sample of men employed in 1995 in plants that closed (over 1995-2000) is slightly higher than the 
charge rate of men employed in 1995 in plants that remained stable. The charge rate over 2000-2004 is 
8.4 percent for men in closing plants compared to 8.0 percent for men in stable plants. This is what we 
would expect if exposure to plant closure results in more crime.  
 A major concern with our empirical strategy is that there are more crime-prone men in 
closing plants even before plants start downsizing. If so, we could not attribute the higher charge rate 
in closing plants over 2000-2004 to plant closure exposure. If such selection existed, we would expect 
higher charge rates among men in closing plants prior to the closure. In fact, the opposite is the case. 
Over 1992-1995, men in closing plants were somewhat less likely to have been charged. 
7.2. Main Results 
Table 2 presents the main results. The estimated plant closure coefficient (cf. η in Eq. 2) captures the 
incremental increase in men’s likelihood of being charged with any crime due to plant closure, relative 
to men in stable plants. In Models 1 and 2, we report the results from logit (odds-ratios reported) and 
OLS regressions controlling for covariates described above and detailed in Appendix B. The estimated 
marginal effects are significant and very similar in magnitude (0.009) across the two models. The 
estimates suggest that exposure to plant closure increases the likelihood of being charged of a crime by 
14 percent.  
 As discussed in Section 4, one concern for our empirical strategy is that plant closure 
events might be concentrated in disadvantaged geographic areas with poor labor market conditions 
and high crime rates. Models 3 and 4 therefore estimate analogous models additionally controlling for 
9,770 geographically defined neighborhood fixed effects. This has no effect on the odds-ratio estimate 
and a modest effect on the OLS estimate, increasing the magnitude somewhat. 
 Even if plant closure is uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of crime, OLS and 
logit estimates of the effect potentially misrepresent the average effect of men’s exposure to plant 
closure on crime if effects are heterogeneous along characteristics correlated with men’s exposure to 
closure. To address this concern, Model 5 provides the estimate of the “average treatment effect” 
using propensity matching methods. Again, the estimated effect is very similar to the others (0.010). 
                                                     
8 As noted in Section 6, our measure of crime is dated according to the time of offense. Hence, the more elaborate “charged 
for a crime committed 2000-2004” would be more precise. 
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This indicates that possible heterogeneous effects do not cause the logit and OLS result to deviate 
seriously from the average treatment effect. 
 Having a family may moderate a young man’s likelihood of spending time in 
criminogenic settings after exposure to plant closure, for example since family commitments involve 
structured routine activities (Felson 1998). Also, though job loss can dissolve the social bounds that 
prevent crime, work related bounds may be relatively less important if the man has a family (Hirschi 
1969, Laub et al. 1998). Following these arguments we would expect to see that married men are less 
likely to respond to exposure to plant closure by engaging in crime. Indeed, when we replicate the 
models over a similarly constructed sample of young married men, closure is associated with an 
insignificant reduction in the likelihood of being charge with any crime.9   
7.3. Specification Tests 
Our estimated effect of plant closure on crime would be upward biased if, at the outset in 1995, 
workers in closing plants have a higher propensity to engage in crime for reasons not controlled for. If 
true, however, we would expect workers in closing plants to have a higher propensity for crime even 
prior to the closing event. Before we formally test this assumption, recall that Table 1 suggests this is 
not a concern: men in subsequently closing plants had modestly lower rates of criminal activity prior 
to 1995 than men in plants that remained stable.  
 If our covariates were not capturing important determinants of crime that are correlated 
with our measure of plant closure, we would expect our estimated effect of exposure to plant closure 
on crime to change when we drop the controls for crime prior to plant closure. In Model 2 of Table 3 
we report the result from the regression where we dropped the set of control variables indicating 
whether (and for what type of crime) the individual was charged over 1992-1995. By comparing with 
the logit estimate (Model 1) from Table 2 (replicated as Model 1 of Table 3) we see that excluding the 
pre-closure crime indicators barely moves the estimate.  
 In Model 3 of Table 3 we report the result from a regression of crime over 1992-1995 
(Charged 1992-1995) on subsequent plant closure (1995-2000).10 The results provide no evidence that 
exposure to plant closure is correlated with pre-existing differences in the propensity for crime. 
Instead, we find that the lower unadjusted crime rate observed for men in closing plants (Table 1) is 
entirely explained by differences in observed characteristics.  
                                                     
9 Estimating Model 1 over the sample of married young men yields an odds-ratio (s.e.) of 0.91 (.06).  
10 Here we have excluded the variables capturing pre-1995 engagement in crime from the set of included covariates. 
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7.4. Robustness  
Table 4 presents several robustness checks. First, Models 2-5 investigate the robustness of our main 
result (Model 1 of Table 2) to variations in the definition of a closing and stable plant. In Models 2 and 
3, we can see that letting closing plants comprise plants downsizing more than 95 and more than 80 
percent, respectively, has a fairly modest impact on the estimates. In Models 4 and 5 we let stable 
plants be defined by plants downsizing 5 and 10 percent or less (and not by 0 or less as in our main 
analytic sample), which again has a modest impact on the estimated effect of plant closure on crime. 
In Model 6 the sample is expanded to include workers in plants with PDR between 0 and 0.9, 
including two additional dummies capturing downsizing events from 0 to 45 percent and from 45 to 90 
percent. We see that major intermediate downsizing events also have some (though insignificant) 
influence on the likelihood of crime.  
 In Models 7 and 8 we investigate whether the estimated effect varies when the sample is 
restricted to workers in plants with at least 20 or 50 FTE in 1995 (and not 10 as in our main analytic 
sample). The estimate is unaffected by the former restriction, but increases somewhat when employees 
of small plants (<50 FTE) are excluded. 
 We have been using a dichotomous dependent variable to capture crime. This means that 
we are only utilizing variation in the data coming from workers not committing or committing crime 
(extensive margin). It is also possible that exposure to plant closure causes workers to intensify their 
engagement in crime (intensive margin). In Model 9 we have set the dependent variable to one if the 
worker committed two or more crimes over 2000-2004 (zero otherwise). We see that plant closure also 
has an effect on this measure of crime; indicating that there is not only an effect on the extensive 
margin.11  
7.5. Category-of-Crime Effects 
Next, we estimate the effect of plant closure on the likelihood individuals are charged with specific 
categories of crime. We report results for the four aggregate categories violent crime, property crime, 
crimes related to alcohol and drugs, and serious traffic violations (see Appendix A for details).  
 Table 5 reports the estimated effects of plant closure under our main specification (Table 
2, Model 1). Workers exposed to plant closure have a significantly higher probability of being charged 
with a traffic violation (see Model 2). The estimated effect on violent crime and crimes related to 
                                                     
11 This suggests that we can improve precision by also utilizing the variation in intensity of crime when estimating the effect 
of plant closure on crime. This potential improvement is, however, limited since the proportion of workers committing more 
than one or two crimes is small. Possibly related to the low frequency of workers with more than two crimes, estimates often 
failed to converge in Poisson or negative binomial specifications.  In all specifications where convergence was achieved, 
Poisson and negative binomial estimates were consistent with the logit estimates.   
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alcohol and drugs, while insignificant, are roughly the same magnitude (Models 3 and 4). In contrast, 
we find no evidence that plant closure increases the likelihood of being charged with a property crime 
(Model 5). 
 The finding that plant closure increases criminal behavior but not property crime appears 
to contrast with the macro-level analyses linking higher unemployment to higher rates of property 
crime. As we mentioned in the Introduction, one possible explanation is that the effect of 
unemployment on property crime rates operates through individuals with marginal attachment to the 
labor market, rather than through individuals who lose a job to which they have been closely attached. 
An alternative explanation is that the combination of the generosity of the Norwegian welfare 
programs and low unemployment limits the extent that displaced workers are motivated to replace licit 
with illicit earnings. In the following we investigate these explanations, using the data to explore the 
plausibility of mechanisms through which job loss may increase non-acquisitive criminal behavior. 
7.6. Plant Closure Effects over Time 
In Table 6, we explore potential mechanisms for the estimated crime effects focusing specifically on 
the potential roles of earnings and idleness. To the extent that closure reduces earnings, the rational 
crime theory would predict an increase in the marginal benefit of illicit earnings. To the extent that 
closure reduces future employment, criminal behavior might increase as a result of increased idleness. 
Reduced earnings and/or unemployment could also be a source for mental distress, which might 
inhibit self-control or increase frustration, leading to more crime. 
 We explore the potential importance of these mechanisms by estimating the effect of 
closure on outcomes over three two-year time periods: 1999-2000, 2001-02 and 2003-04. Our 
motivation in doing so is to investigate whether the timing of the crime effects conforms with the 
timing of the earnings and employment effects.  
 We find little evidence to support the notion that reduced earnings explain the increase in 
criminal behavior among workers exposed to plant closure. Plant closure is associated with a reduction 
in subsequent earnings, which (in our data) includes payments received from work-related insurance 
schemes like unemployment and sick leave benefits. The estimated effects are, however, modest and 
insignificant across all time periods (see Panel A).12 This presumably reflects, at least partly, the 
generosity of unemployment benefits and other social programs than mitigate the earnings effect of 
job loss. This might also explain why we find no effect of plant closure on property crimes.  
                                                     
12 In US dollars, the estimates indicate a mean reduction in annual earnings of $150 to $250. Of course, the mean effect could 
mask large reductions in earnings suffered by some individual workers exposed to closure.   
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 In Panel B, we report estimates showing that exposure to closure reduces the subsequent 
time spent in full time employment by roughly a week per year. The estimated effect is largest in the 
period most contemporaneous with the measured closures (1999-2000), but remains substantial and 
significant across all periods. This provides some support for the notion that idleness or mental distress 
due to unemployment plays a role in explaining the effect of closure on crime. 
 The time dimension of crime effects (Panels C-G) are somewhat difficult to evaluate 
given the imprecision of the estimates. Panel C indicates that the estimated effect of closure on the 
probability of being charged with any crime is largest in the final years of our analysis (2003-2004). 
The estimated effects of closure on violent crime (Panel D) and traffic violations (Panel G) also appear 
driven by higher crime rates of exposed workers in the latter years of our analysis.  These results 
potentially pose a challenge to the idleness and mental distress mechanisms. If, for example, plant 
closure-induced reductions in full-time employment afford exposed workers more opportunities to 
commit crime, we might have expected crime effects to be largest when measured over 1999-2000, 
when the negative employment effect was largest. On the other hand, if prolonged unemployment is 
necessary in order to trigger criminal behavior associated with idleness and/or mental distress, this 
potentially explains the later timing of crime effects. Though imprecisely estimated, the timing of 
effects on crimes related to alcohol and drugs (Panel F) closely conforms with the timing of 
employment effects. This suggests that the time afforded from reduced employment plays an 
immediate role in alcohol and drug-related crimes. 
7.7. Crime Effects by Day-of-Week 
To further investigate the plausibility of the idleness mechanism, we also estimate the effect of plant 
closure on crimes committed on different days of the week. Our motivation for this analysis is 
straightforward. If job loss increases criminal activity by increasing idleness, we expect the crime 
effect to be more pronounced on weekdays, with little differences on weekends.  
 In Figure 1 we report odds-ratios (with 95 percent confidence intervals) from logit 
regressions of exposure to plant closure on Charged 2000-2004 on the given day of the week, 
applying our main specification (Model 1, Table 2). The figure also includes results where weekdays 
are grouped together and where Saturdays and Sundays are grouped together. The estimated positive 
effect of closure on crime holds only for crimes committed on work days, consistent with a role for 
idleness.  
 We replicate this analysis by individual categories of crime in Figure 2. These results also 
offer some support for the idleness mechanism, though they should be interpreted cautiously as the 
confidence intervals are wide. For crimes related to alcohol and drugs and for traffic violations, the 
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positive closure effect is driven by an increase in crimes committed during the work week. The result 
regarding crimes related to alcohol and drugs suggests a relationship between idleness and 
consumption of alcohol and drugs. One might also conjecture that this is indication of a mental health 
effect (e.g. Vahtera and Kivimaki 1997, Dragano et al. 2005), of which consumption of alcohol and 
drugs could be a symptom. However, if our result was solely related to mental distress, we might 
expect an effect on this type of crime on weekends as well, of which there is little indication. For 
property crimes, we find weak support that closure induces a shift from weekend to weekday crimes.  
 In contrast, for violent crimes there is no support for an idleness mechanism, as closure 
significantly increases the likelihood of committing violent crime on Saturdays but otherwise has little 
effect. While a potential challenge to the idleness mechanism, this finding is complicated by the nature 
of violent crime. Violent crime requires victims, who are perhaps most available on Saturdays.13 
Assuming that plant closure does not affect the opportunity to commit violent crimes, the significant 
increase in violent crimes committed on Saturdays could reflect the impact of job loss on mental 
distress.  
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we estimate the impact of plant closure on crime using a panel data set comprising more 
than 44,000 unmarried Norwegian men below the age of 40. Our results suggest that plant closure in 
the man’s plant of employment significantly increases the likelihood of being charged of a crime. The 
men originally employed in plants that closed from 1995 to 2000 were about 14 percent more likely to 
be charged with at least one crime over 2000-2004 than comparable men in stable plants. We find no 
evidence of differences in charge rates prior to plant closure and estimates are robust to neighborhood 
fixed effects, lending support to a causal interpretation of the result. 
 Contrary to the predictions of traditional rational crime theory, as well as the existing 
literature analyzing the effect of area unemployment on crime rates, we find no evidence that exposure 
to plant closure increases the likelihood of property crime. Instead, closure is associated with 
significantly higher charge rates for traffic violations, with insignificant effects of similar magnitude 
estimated for violent crime and crimes related to alcohol and drugs.  
 Our analysis of plausible mechanisms potentially helps reconcile our findings for 
property crime with those of the macro-based literature. We find that plant closure has only a small 
and insignificant effect on a measure of subsequent earnings that includes employment-related 
insurance benefits. We attribute this result to the generosity of employment-related insurance benefits 
                                                     
13 Card and Dahl (2009) employ the idea of “victim availability” in testing rational choice models of violent behavior.   
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and the low unemployment rates in Norway, which reduce the income loss associated with job 
displacement.  
 Our findings suggest that idleness is likely an important mechanism through which plant 
closure affects crime. Plant closure has a substantial negative effect on the subsequent full-time 
employment that persists over time. Consistent with an idleness story, we find in our day-of-week 
analysis that the effect of plant closure on crime is driven almost entirely by an increase in weekday 
crimes. Plant closure appears to have little or no effect on crimes committed on the weekend. While 
this does not rule out a potential role for mental distress in explaining the crime effects, it does 
indicate that mental distress cannot be the sole mechanism at work. If it were, there is no reason why 
the crime effects would be limited to weekdays. On the other hand, some role for mental distress is 
suggested by the significant increase in violent crimes committed on Saturdays. 
 Support for the idleness mechanism is particularly strong for alcohol and drug-related 
offenses, where the positive crime effects over time conform closely with the negative employment 
effects. This also suggests a relationship between idleness and consumption of alcohol and drugs, as 
indicated by recent studies (e.g. Crawford et al. 2006, Deb et al. 2009, Eliason and Storie 2009).  
 In contrast, for our aggregate measure of crime (“committed any crime”), as well as in the 
categories of violent crime and traffic violations, the crime effects appear largest in the later years of 
our study when the employment effects are smaller. This potentially represents a challenge to the 
idleness mechanism. However, it seems plausible that prolonged unemployment is necessary to trigger 
(some) criminal behaviors associated with idleness or, for that matter, mental distress. This could 
explain why larger crimes effects are observed later in time.  
 Additional research can hopefully further our understanding of the relationships between 
job displacement, abuse of alcohol and drugs, mental health, and crime. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics. Main Analytic Sample 
Variable All Men in closing plants Men in stable plants 
Plant closure  0.3167   
Charged 2000-2004 0.0813 0.0843 0.0800 
Age  29.88 (4.914) 
30.39** 
(4.919) 
29.640 
(4.894) 
Income 250 530 (167 232) 
251 668 
(115 013) 
250 002 
(186 543) 
Number of children  0.412 (0.721) 
0.430** 
(0.739) 
0.403 
(0.712) 
Years of education 12.81 (2.64) 
12.83 
(2.77) 
12.79 
(2.57) 
Years of working experience 10.50 (5.02) 
10.97** 
(5.06) 
10.28 
(4.99) 
Net wealth  -102 174 (458 991) 
-106 109 
(432 658) 
-100 350 
(470 694) 
FTE of plant  172.8 (340.7) 
194.9** 
(286.7) 
162.6 
(362.6) 
Mean age of workers in plant 38.62 (4.62) 
39.50** 
(4.75) 
38.22 
(4.49) 
Mean years of education of 
workers in plant 
12.38 
(1.23) 
12.36 
(1.24) 
12.39 
(1.23) 
Mean income of workers in plant  258 020 (91 783) 
257 848 
(96 313) 
258 100 
(89 607) 
Rate of females in plant 0.251 (0.216) 
0.262** 
(0.220) 
0.245 
(0.214) 
Rate of all workers in plant 
committing a crime 1995 
0.017 
(0.028) 
0.016** 
(0.029) 
0.018 
(0.028) 
Charged 1992-1995 0.109 0.102** 0.112 
Charged 1992 0.0386 0.0383 0.0387 
Charged 1993 0.0352 0.0315** 0.0369 
Charged 1994 0.0294 0.0284 0.0299 
Charged 1995 0.0287 0.0262* 0.0298 
Charged 1996 0.0270 0.0248* 0.0280 
Charged 1997 0.0283 0.0270 0.0289 
Charged 1998 0.0233 0.0233 0.0233 
Charged 1999 0.0242 0.0238 0.0244 
Charged 2000 0.0231 0.0231 0.0231 
Charged 2001 0.0229 0.0246 0.0221 
Charged 2002 0.0212 0.0211 0.0212 
Charged 2003 0.0205 0.0223 0.0196 
Charged 2004 0.0193 0.0203 0.0189 
# observations 44 391 14 060 30 331 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Variables are measured in 1995 unless otherwise specified. 
* and** indicate that the variable is significantly different across the group of men in closing and stable 
plants at the 5 and 1 percent level (t-test). 
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Table 2:  Main results: Effect on Crime (2000-2004) of Young Unmarried Men Being Exposed 
to Plant Closure (1995-2000) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent variable: Charged over 2000 – 2004 
 1.14** 0.0087** 1.14** 0.0099** 0.0097** 
Plant closure  (0.047) (0.0029) (0.046) (0.0034) (0.0036) 
 [0.0090]     
Neigborhood FE 
included   X X  
Mean of dependent 
variable  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
R-squared  0.07  0.29  
N 44 391 44 391 44 391 44 391 43 836 
Note:Model 1 is logit estimate (odds-ratio) for the effect on crime (2000-2004) of closure of the plant 
of employment in 1995; with implied mean marginal effect in brackets. Model 2 is OLS estimate. 
Model 3 and Model 4 replicate the logit and OLS models (respectively), augmented with 
neighborhood fixed effects. Model 5 is propensity-matched estimate of the average treatment effect 
using the nearest neighbor matching method (with caliper 0.01, and bootstrapped standard errors), cf. 
psmatch2 written for Stata9 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). * and ** denote significance at the 5 and 1 
percent levels. For Models 1-3, robust standard errors in parentheses corrected for non-independent 
observations within plant. All models include covariates described in text, and 9 770 neighborhood 
fixed effects if indicated. 
 
 
Table 3: Specification Tests: Plant Closure (1995-2000) Uncorrelated with Preceding Crime 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable:   Charged 2000-2004 Charged 2000-2004 Charged 1992-1995
Plant Closure 1.14** (0.047) 
1.13** 
(0,047) 
1.00 
(0.036) 
Covariates for Charged 1992-1995 by
category dropped  X X 
Mean of dependent variable 0.08 0.08 0.11 
N 44 391 44 391 44 391 
Note: Odds-ratios from logit estimation. * and ** denote significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses corrected for non-independent observations within plant. All 
models include covariates described in text. 
 
22
 
T
ab
le
 4
: R
ob
us
tn
es
s C
he
ck
s:
 E
ff
ec
t o
f P
la
nt
 C
lo
su
re
 (1
99
5-
20
00
) o
n 
C
ri
m
e 
(2
00
0-
20
04
) b
y 
V
ar
yi
ng
 D
ef
in
iti
on
s a
nd
 S
am
pl
es
 
 
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
M
od
el
 4
 
M
od
el
 5
 
M
od
el
 6
 
M
od
el
 7
 
M
od
el
 8
 
M
od
el
 9
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
  
C
ha
rg
ed
 
20
00
-2
00
4 
C
ha
rg
ed
 
20
00
-2
00
4 
C
ha
rg
ed
 
20
00
-2
00
4 
C
ha
rg
ed
 
20
00
-2
00
4 
C
ha
rg
ed
 
20
00
-2
00
4 
C
ha
rg
ed
 
20
00
-2
00
4 
C
ha
rg
ed
 
20
00
-2
00
4 
C
ha
rg
ed
 
20
00
-2
00
4 
C
ha
rg
ed
 a
t 
le
as
t t
w
ic
e 
20
00
-2
00
4 
1.
14
**
 
 
 
1.
15
**
 
1.
16
**
 
1.
13
**
 
1.
13
* 
1.
18
**
 
1.
21
**
 
Pl
an
t C
lo
su
re
 (P
D
R
>.
9)
 
(0
.0
47
) 
 
 
(0
.0
46
) 
(0
.0
45
) 
(0
.0
45
) 
(0
.0
54
) 
(0
.0
70
) 
(0
.0
83
) 
 
1.
11
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD
R
 >
 .9
5 
 
(0
.0
48
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
12
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD
R
 >
 .8
 
 
 
(0
.0
45
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
07
 
 
 
 
PD
R
 in
 (0
.4
5,
0.
9]
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
51
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.
97
 
 
 
 
PD
R
 in
 (0
,.0
.4
5]
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
33
) 
 
 
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
re
de
fin
iti
on
  
 
O
bs
. w
ith
 P
D
R
 
in
 (0
.9
,0
.9
5]
 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 
O
bs
. w
ith
 P
D
R
 
in
 (0
.8
,0
.9
] a
ls
o 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
O
bs
. w
ith
 P
D
R
 
in
 (0
,0
.0
5)
 a
ls
o 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
O
bs
. w
ith
 P
D
R
 
in
 (0
,0
.1
) a
ls
o 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
O
bs
. w
ith
 P
D
R
 
in
 (0
,0
.9
] a
ls
o 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
O
bs
. w
ith
 
FT
E 
< 
20
 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 
O
bs
. w
ith
 
FT
E 
< 
50
 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 
 
M
ea
n 
of
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ria
bl
e 
0.
08
 
0.
08
 
0.
08
 
0.
08
 
0.
08
 
0.
08
 
0.
08
 
0.
08
 
0.
03
 
N
 
44
 3
91
 
42
 8
50
 
46
 4
07
 
49
 8
84
 
56
 2
38
 
92
 0
39
 
34
 8
32
 
23
 0
55
 
44
 3
76
 
N
ot
e:
 O
dd
s-
ra
tio
s f
ro
m
 lo
gi
t e
st
im
at
io
n.
 *
 a
nd
 *
* 
de
no
te
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
5 
an
d 
1 
pe
rc
en
t l
ev
el
s. 
R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 c
or
re
ct
ed
 fo
r n
on
-
in
de
pe
nd
en
t o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 w
ith
in
 p
la
nt
. A
ll 
m
od
el
s i
nc
lu
de
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s d
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 te
xt
. 
 
23 
Table 5: Effect of Plant Closure (1995-2000) on Crime (2000-2004) by Category of Crime 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent variable: Charged  
(2000-04) for:   
Any 
Crime 
Traffic 
violation 
Violent 
crime 
Alcohol 
and Drugs 
Property 
crime 
1.14** 1.19** 1.15 1.16+ 0.91 Plant Closure  (0.047) (0.064) (0.13) (0.097) (0.13) 
Mean of dependent variable 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 
N 44 391 44 391 44 376 44 376 44 376 
Note: Odds-ratios from logit estimation. +, * and ** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses corrected for non-independent observations within plant. 
All models include covariates described in text. Crime categories follow closely the US FBI 
definitions and are defined in the Appendix. Models 3-5 estimated with 15 fewer observations due to 
no variation of the outcome variable within the group of persons with missing on education. 
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Table 6:  Effect of Plant Closure (1995-2000) on Earnings, Employment and Categories of 
Crime over Time 
 1999-2000 2001-2002 2003-2004 
A.  Dependent variable: Mean earnings over given period   
-1 122 -1 303 -1 493 Plant Closure  (2 327) (2 981) (2 954) 
Mean of dependent variable  330 732 368 872 396 538 
B.  Dependent variable: Days full-time employed in given period   
-16.8** -11.0** -12.4** 
Plant Closure  (2.76) (2.76) (3.05) 
Mean of dependent variable  644.4 647.3 620.6 
C.  Dependent variable: Charged for any crime over given period   
1.06 1.08 1.18** Plant Closure  (0.057) (0.061) (0.070) 
Mean of dependent variable  0.04 0.04 0.04 
D.  Dependent variable: Charged for property crime over given period  
0.99 0.88 0.95 
Plant Closure  (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) 
Mean of dependent variable  0.00 0.00 0.00 
E.  Dependent variable: Charged for violent crime over given period  
0.88 1.15 1.10 
Plant Closure  (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) 
Mean of dependent variable  0.01 0.00 0.00 
F.  Dependent variable: Charged for alcohol and drugs related crimes over given period  
1.24* 1.17 1.18 Plant Closure  (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Mean of dependent variable  0.01 0.01 0.01 
G.  Dependent variable: Charged for traffic violation over given period  
1.05 1.17+ 1.17* Plant Closure  (0.080) (0.093) (0.089) 
Mean of dependent variable  0.02 0.02 0.02 
Note: N=44 391. Panels A and B report OLS estimates. Panels C-G reports odds-ratios from logit 
estimation. +, * and ** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses corrected for non-independent observations within plant. All models include covariates 
described in text. Some crime models estimated with 15 fewer observations (N=44 376) due to no 
variation of the outcome variable within the group of persons with missing education. 
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Figure 1: Effect of Plant Closure on Charged 2000-2004 by Day of Week 
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Figure 2: Effect of Plant Closure on Given Crime Category by Day of Week 
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Appendix A 
Definition of crime categories  
In this paper we have created crime categories that resemble the categories most widely used in the 
literature, i.e. the categories defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program of the US FBI 
(see http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/). These categories deviate somewhat from the standards in the 
official Norwegian crime statistics. There are some important reasons why it is difficult to make 
comparisons of crime categories across countries. First, there are differences in legislations so that the 
specific contents may differ. Second, there are differences in registration routines and coding schemes 
used by the police. Third, the priority of the police, and thus also detection rates, are influenced by 
public concerns. For further examples of the difficulties that apply, see e.g. the appendixes in The 
European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (http://www.europeansourcebook.org/).  
 Our creation of UCR-like categories is based on the fine-graded standard categorizations 
used to produce official crime statistics in Norway (Statistics Norway 2008). In the overview below, 
we also refer to Norwegian legislation (of which some is available in English translations online at 
URL: http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulov/english.html). Most of the legislations refer to the General Civil 
Penal Code, but there are also offences regulated elsewhere.  
 In the paper we have aggregated the UCR (2004) categories as follows:  
 Violent crime comprises the UCR categories criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, other assaults, sex offences, and offences against the family and children.  
 Property crime comprises the UCR categories burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, 
and stolen property: buying, receiving, possessing.  
 Alcohol and Drugs comprises the UCR categories drug abuse violations, driving under 
the influence, and drunkenness.  
 Traffic violation follows the Norwegian definition, but driving under the influence is 
excluded (since it is included in the “Alcohol and Drugs” category above). Traffic violations include 
only more serious violations like excessive speed driving.  
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Overview of categories 
 
UCR Categories     Translation of Norwegian Category 
 
Criminal homicide       
Drap (§ 233)      Murder 
Uaktsomt drap (§ 239)      Manslaughter 
 
Forcible rape 
Voldtekt (§ 192)      Rape 
Seksuell omgang m/trusler,     Sexual intercourse by threats,  
   underfundig adferd o.l. (§ 192, 200)        cunning behaviour etc. 
Seksuell omgang med bevisstløs (§192, 200)  Sexual intercourse with unconscious person 
Voldtektsforsøk (§ 192, jf. § 49)    Attempted rape 
 
Robbery 
Utpressing og ran (kapittel 25)     Blackmail and robbery 
 
Aggravated assault 
Legemsbeskadigelse (§ 229)    Wounding or inflicting bodily harm 
Grov legemsbeskadigelse (§ 231)    Inflicting grievous bodily harm 
Drapsforsøk (§ 233 jf. § 49)    Attempted murder 
 
Burglary 
Innbrudd (§ 147)      Housebreaking and burglary 
 
Larceny-theft 
Simpelt tyveri (§ 257, 261-262)    Simple and minor larceny 
Grovt tyveri (§ 258)     Aggravated larceny 
Nasking       Petty larceny 
 
Motor veichle theft 
Brukstyveri av motorkjøretøy (§ 260)   Theft of motor vehicle 
 
Arson 
Forsettelig forvoldelse av ildebrann (§ 148)   Arson 
Uaktsom forvoldelse av ildebrann (§ 151)    Negligently causing fire 
 
Other assault 
Legemsfornærmelse (§ 228)     Assault 
Uaktsom legemsbeskadigelse (§ 237, 238)    Negligently inflicting bodily harm 
Annet (§ 234, 240-245)      Other assault 
 
Forgery and counterfeiting 
Dokumentfalsk (kapittel 18)     Forgery 
Pengefalsk (kapittel 17)      Counterfeiting 
 
Fraud 
Bedrageri og utroskap (kapittel 26)    Fraud and betrayal  
 
Embezzelment 
Underslag (kapittel 24, § 255-256)    Embezzlement 
 
Stolen property: buying, receiving, posessing 
Heleri og etterfølgende bistand (kapittel 31)   Receiving stolen goods, assistance  
         to the offender 
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UCR Categories     Translation of Norwegian Category  
 
Vandalism 
Simpelt skadeverk (§ 291)     Inflicting ordinary damage 
Grovt skadeverk (§ 292)      Inflicting serious damage 
Skadeverk, forseelse (§324-436)     Inflicting damage to property, misdemeanour 
 
Weapons: carrying, possessing 
None apply 
 
Prostitution and commercialized vice  
None apply 
 
Sex offences (except rape, prostitution) 
Incest (§ 197, 198) Incest 
Seksuell omgang med barn (§195-196, §200)  Sexual intercourse with children 
Annen seksuell omgang (§ 193, 199)    Other sexual intercourse 
Seksuelt krenkende eller annen uanstendig atferd (§ 201) Sexual violating or other indecent behavior 
Pornografi (§ 204)      Pornography 
Annet (§ 200, 202, 203)     Other 
 
Drug abuse violations 
Narkotikaforbrytelse (§ 162 1. og 4. ledd)    Crime of narcotics 
Grov narkotikaforbrytelse (§ 162 2. og 3. ledd)   Serious crime of narcotics 
Narkotika, bruk  (lov om legemidler)   Use of narcotics 
Narkotika, besittelse (lov om legemidler)   Possession of narcotics 
Narkotika, diverse (lov om legemidler)   Other crime in connection with narcotics 
 
Gambling 
Åger og lykkespill (kapittel 29)     Usury and gaming offenses 
 
Offenses against the family and children 
Misligholdt forsørgelsesplikt mv. (§ 219)    Defaulting obligation to support dependents 
Inngåelse av ugyldig eller omstøtelig ekteskap (§ 220) Contracting non-valid or annulable marriage 
Bortføring av barn (§ 216)     Kidnapping children 
Annet (§ 215-219)      Other 
 
Driving under the influence 
Promillekjøring (veitrafikkloven)    Driving under influence of alcohol etc. 
 
Liquor law 
Forseelse og forbrytelser mot alkoholloven  Violations of the Alcohol legislation 
 
Drunkenness 
Drukkenskap (løsgjengerloven)    Drunkenness 
 
Disorderly conduct 
Ordensforstyrrelse (løsgjengerloven)   Disorderly conduct 
Forseelse mot politivedtektene     Violations of the Police regulations 
 
Vagrancy 
Annet (løsgjengerloven)     Other, vagrancy 
 
All other offenses 
Everything else 
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Appendix B 
Covariates included in all regressions 
The following variables are included in all models (unless explicitly specified otherwise):  
− age: third order polynomial  
− age of youngest child: 6 categories (≤1, 1-3, 3-7, 7-13, >13, missing) 
− number of kids: third order polynomial 
− years of education: 5 categories (≤ 10, 10-13, 13-16, ≥16, missing) 
− charged once for property crime over 1992-1995: 2 categories 
− charged twice or more for property crimes over 1992-1995: 2 categories 
− charged once for violent crime over 1992-1995: 2 categories 
− charged twice or more for violent crimes over 1992-1995: 2 categories 
− charged once for crime related to alcohol and drugs over 1992-1995: 2 categories 
− charged twice or more for crimes related to alcohol and drugs over 1992-1995: 2 cate-
gories 
− charged once for other (not violent, property and alcohol/drugs) crime over 1992-
1995: 2 categories 
− charged twice or more for other (not violent, property and alcohol/drugs) crimes over 
1992-1995: 2 categories 
− years of labor market experience: third order polynomial 
− income: third order polynomial  
− net wealth: third order polynomial 
− earnings: third order polynomial 
− received sick money in year: 2 categories 
− industry of 1995-plant: 10 categories  
− number of FTEs in 1995-plant: third order polynomial 
− mean age of all employees in 1995-plant: third order polynomial 
− mean years of education of all employees in 1995-plant: third order polynomial 
− mean income of all employees in 1995-plant: third order polynomial 
− rate of all employees in 1995-plant female: third order polynomial 
− rate of all employees in 1995-plant committing crime in 1995: third order polynomial  
− mean of annual male unemployment rate 1995-2000 in municipality of residence in 
1995: linear  
 
